

NEVMUN'19

UN Office on Drugs and Crime

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

- I.** Word of Welcome from the Chairs
- II.** Introduction to the Committee

TOPIC A: Combating the Hawala System

- A.** Introduction to the Agenda Item
- B.** Definition of the Key Terms
- C.** General Overview:
 - 1.** Historical Background
 - 2.** Major Parties Involved
 - 3.** Social Impacts
 - 4.** Economic Impacts
- D.** Timeline of Events
- E.** Conclusion
- F.** Questions a Resolution Should Cover

TOPIC B: Corruption in Prison Systems

- A.** Introduction to the Agenda Item
- B.** Definition of the Key Terms
- C.** General Overview:
 - 1.** Current Situation and Legal Aspects
 - 2.** Main Examples of Corruption in Prison Systems
- D.** Conclusion
- D.** Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue
- E.** Questions a Resolution Should Cover
- F.** References and Further Reading

I. Word of Welcome from the Chairs

Honorable delegates of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Committee,

We are thrilled to welcome you all to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) at NEVMUN 2019.

Through this study guide you will get an introduction to the topics that will be discussed in our committee, so while we recommend you all to take the effort to read this guide entirely, we would also like to remind that this study guide will serve as your starting point for your research. It is your responsibility to make the necessary further research in order to be able to contribute to the efficiency of this committee throughout the conference. Additionally, being familiar with the rules of procedure will have great importance in order for us to provide you with the best UN simulation.

Please do not hesitate to contact us at any time if have any questions concerning the topics or the conference in general. Our task is to help you throughout this Model United Nations experience and make it the best one possible. We cannot wait to meet you all and hear your solutions regarding the issues at hand.

Best Wishes,

Yağmur Söylemez&Zümra Aydoğdu

Co-chais of UNODC

II. Introduction to the Committee

UNODC is a global leader in the fight against illicit drugs and international crime. Established in 1997 through a merger between the United Nations Drug Control Programme and the Centre for International Crime Prevention, UNODC operates in all regions of the world through an extensive network of field offices. UNODC relies on voluntary contributions, mainly from Governments, for 90 per cent of its budget.

UNODC is mandated to assist Member States in their struggle against illicit drugs, crime and terrorism. In the Millennium Declaration, Member States also resolved to intensify efforts to fight transnational crime in all its dimensions, to redouble the efforts to implement the commitment to counter the world drug problem and to take concerted action against international terrorism.

The three pillars of the UNODC work programme are:

Field-based technical cooperation projects to enhance the capacity of Member States to counteract illicit drugs, crime and terrorism

Research and analytical work to increase knowledge and understanding of drugs and crime issues and expand the evidence base for policy and operational decisions


Normative work to assist States in the ratification and implementation of the relevant international treaties, the development of domestic legislation on drugs, crime and terrorism, and the provision of secretariat and substantive services to the treaty-based and governing bodies

In pursuing its objectives, UNODC makes every effort to integrate and mainstream the gender perspective, particularly in its projects for the provision of alternative livelihoods, as well as those against human trafficking.

Topic A: Combating the Hawala System

A. Introduction to the Agenda Item:

Hawala is a method of transferring money without any money actually moving. Interpol's definition of hawala is "money transfer without money movement." Another definition is simply "trust." Hawala is an alternative remittance channel that exists outside of traditional banking systems. Transactions between hawala brokers are made without promissory notes because the system is heavily based on trust and the balancing of hawala brokers' books. Hawala, also known as hundi, literally means transfer or remittance.



Hawala, in its most basic delineation, is “money transfer without money movement,” without movement in formal financial institutions that is. Upon customer request, a US based hawaladar - a hawala operator - will call, fax, or email their hawaladar associate in Pakistan, for example, with the specifics of the transaction (i.e. amount and password only - no names are used). This Pakistan based hawaladar will then pay the requested amount out of his/her own funds, and in local currency, upon receiving the agreed upon password from the recipient. The only paper trail might be a notation, often encoded or in a little-known dialect (e.g. Gujarati or Memoni), of the debt obligation in internal books. The funds are distributed, often delivered right to the door of the intended recipient, all within a course of minutes, without receipts or paperwork, and all outside of formal financial institutions. Theoretically, payments between hawaladars operate both ways. In our example the Pakistani hawaladar could just as easily request that his US colleague pay out X to a US recipient. Our US and Pakistani hawaladars would be dealing concurrently with operators in Dhaka, Muscat, Istanbul, London, etc. Hundreds or thousands of these transactions are bundled together over the course of weeks or months with consolidation taking place at various levels. In Dubai, at

the mega level, tranches of value worth £100,000 are the minimum units of trade in each hawala swap.

B. Definition of Key Terms

money laundering: the concealment of the origins of illegally obtained money, typically by means of transfers involving foreign banks or legitimate businesses

terrorism: the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims

narco terrorism: in its original context, narco terrorism is understood to mean the attempts of narcotics traffickers to influence the policies of a government or a society through violence and intimidation, and to hinder the enforcement of anti-drug laws by the systematic threat or use of such violence

drug dealers: a person who sells illegal drugs

smuggling: the illegal movement of goods into or out of a country

black money: black money is payment from illegal activity, usually received in cash from under ground economic transactions and, as such, not taxed but often laundered

m-pesa: M-Pesa is a mobile banking service that allows users to store and transfer money through their mobile phones

Unified Payment Interface(UPI): a Unified Payment Interface (UPI) is a

smartphone application which allows users to transfer money between bank accounts.

ripple(cryptocurrency): ripple is a technology that acts as both a cryptocurrency and a digital payment network for financial transactions.

Bank Giro: a bank giro transfer is a method of transferring money by instructing a bank to transfer funds from one bank account to another without the use of physical checks

wire transfer: a wire transfer is an electronic transfer of funds across a network administered by hundreds of banks around the world

IFT: Interferential Therapy or (**IFT**) is a type of electrotherapy treatments that use electric currents to stimulate tissue **which** provides pain relief, reduction of swelling and many other health benefits



A TYPICAL MONEY LAUNDERING SCHEME



C. General Overview

a. Historical Background:

A few years ago, if a construction worker in a Mumbai wanted to send money to his nephew in Dubai, he would have gone to a shop in one of his city's seedier districts. There, he'd hand cash in Indian rupees to a broker in return for a secret code. His nephew would then go to a shop in Dubai, say the code and take the equivalent amount home, in dirhams. This system of transferring money is called Hawala. It has several other names in different countries, such as hundi in some places, but the basic idea remains same: money never actually crosses borders. In our example, the broker in Mumbai takes the cash, then another broker in Dubai gives out the same amount in dirhams after taking a commission. The system works essentially through an underground network. A handler in one country accepts cash from a customer and then a handler in another country will hand out the equivalent amount (minus commission) overseas. Each handler ensures that the inflow and outflow of money is more or less balanced, once commission is taken into account. Because money never crosses borders, handlers cut out the expensive international bank transfer fees. Further, because the entire system is done via informal agreement, access to bank accounts aren't required for any parties. Hawala is based on trust. While Hawala may sound like a dream come true to some, there's a caveat. A big one. Hawala is illegal. Because transactions are made outside the conventional banking system and all the regulations that come with it, Hawala has become infamous as an easy way to fund dangerous and suspicious activities.³ Following the September 11th attacks in the US, many countries began mandating that all money transfer services keep accurate records of financial transactions. Despite this, Hawala remains a bit of a gray area, and many users are becoming more wary of using it.

b. Major Parties Involved

the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC):

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) was established in 1997 through a merger of the United Nations Drug Control Programme and the Centre for International Crime Prevention.

The office was created to assist the UN in providing a coordinated and comprehensive response to the related issues of drug trafficking and drug abuse, crime prevention and criminal justice, international terrorism, and political corruption.



UNODC

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL):

Founded in 1923, Interpol is an international police organisation made up of 194 member countries. It is not a police force in the traditional sense—its agents are not able to arrest criminals.

Instead, it is more of an information-sharing network, providing a way for national police forces to co-operate effectively and tackle international crime ranging from human trafficking and terrorism to money laundering and illegal art dealing. The organisation, based in France, operates centralised criminal databases that contain fingerprint records, DNA samples and stolen documents: a treasure trove so valuable that police consulted it 146 times every second in 2017. Interpol's other main function is to issue notices: alerts to member states for missing or wanted persons. The best-known of these is the "Red Notice", a notification that a member state would like someone arrested. States are not obliged to follow these notices, but will often treat them as a warrant for someone's arrest and extradition. "Diffusions", which can be issued with less bureaucracy, are another popular way of seeking arrests through Interpol.



INTERPOL



FARC:
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc, after the initials in Spanish) are Colombia's largest rebel group. They were founded in 1964 as the armed wing of the Communist Party and follow a Marxist-Leninist ideology. Their main founders were small farmers and land workers who had banded together to fight against the staggering levels of inequality in Colombia at the time. While the Farc have some urban groups, they have always been an overwhelmingly rural guerrilla organisation.



c. Social Effects


Economic and cultural factors explain the attractiveness of the hawala system. It is less expensive, swifter, more reliable, more convenient, and less bureaucratic than the formal financial sector. Hawaldars charge fees or sometimes use the exchange rate spread to generate income. The fees charged by hawaladars on the transfer of funds are lower than those charged by banks and other remitting companies, thanks mainly to minimal overhead expenses and the absence of regulatory costs to the hawaladars, who often operate other small businesses. To encourage foreign exchange transfers through their system, hawaladars sometimes exempt expatriates from paying fees. In contrast, they reportedly charge higher fees to those who use the system to avoid exchange, capital, or administrative controls. These higher fees often cover all the expenses of the hawaladars.

The system is swifter than formal financial transfer systems partly because of the lack of bureaucracy and the simplicity of its operating mechanism; instructions are given to correspondents by phone, facsimile, or e-mail; and funds are often delivered door to door within 24 hours by a correspondent who has quick access to villages even in remote areas. The documentation requirements, management, bureaucratic reduce the time operations.

In addition factors, and personal hawaladars and make this and easy to use. and proximity appreciated by communities. their clients, instruct their deliver funds to expatriate

payments. Moreover, cultural considerations encourage expatriate workers to remit funds through the hawala system, and such considerations also apply to family members in the home country.

Many expatriate communities are exclusively male, because wives and other family members remain in the home country, where family traditions prevail. These traditions may require family members, especially women, to maintain minimal contacts with the outside world. A trusted hawaladar, known in the village and aware of the social codes, would be an acceptable intermediary, protecting women from having direct dealings with banks and other agents. Thus, a system based on national, ethnic, and village solidarity depends more on absolute trust between the participants than on legal documents.



minimal and accounting the simple and the lack of procedures help needed for transfer

to economic kinship, ethnic ties, relations between expatriate workers system convenient The flexible hours of hawaladars are expatriate To accommodate hawaladars may counterparts to beneficiaries before workers make

d. Economic Effects

Despite its informality, the hawala system has direct and indirect macroeconomic implications—for financial activity as well as for fiscal performance. One aspect is its potential impact on the monetary accounts of countries on either end of the hawala transaction. Because these transactions are not reflected in official statistics, the remittance of funds from one country to another is not recorded as an increase in the recipient country's foreign assets or in the remitting country's liabilities, unlike funds transferred through the formal sector. As a consequence, value changes hands, but broad money is unaltered. However, hawala transactions may affect the composition of broad money in a recipient country. In the remittance business, such transactions are conducted mainly in cash, even though hawaladars may use the banking system for other purposes. Individuals from developing countries who transfer funds abroad through the hawala system for investment or other purposes are usually members of wealthy groups. They supply local hawaladars with cash by making withdrawals from their bank accounts. As a consequence, hawala-type transactions tend to increase the amount of cash in circulation. Furthermore, IFT systems have fiscal implications for both remitting and receiving countries because no direct or indirect tax is paid on hawala transactions. The negative impact on government revenue applies equally to both legitimate and illegitimate activities that involve the hawala system.



Hawala transactions cannot be reliably quantified because records are virtually inaccessible, especially for statistical or balance of payments purposes. This holds true for both the remitting and, especially, the receiving sides of the transactions. Hawala transactions from developing countries are sometimes driven by capital flight motivations; they may also be driven by a desire to circumvent exchange control regulations and the like, leaving no traceable records. Nevertheless, the authorities of some countries have sporadically made estimates of hawala activity based on their expatriate populations and balance of payments data. In any case, all crude estimates should take into account both hawala and reverse hawala transactions (see box) as well as transactions driven by illicit activities. Although it would be impossible to provide a precise figure, the amounts involved in hawala transactions are likely to entail billions of dollars.

A. Timeline of Events

1988	UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substances otherwise known as the “Vienna Convention”, focused on ways to combat money laundering
1989	The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is founded with 34 member states and two regional organization members, the cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and the European Commission
1997	Global Programme Against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism is launched by the UN Office against Drugs and Crime, with the purpose of ratifying and implementing international legislation against the finance of terrorism.
1999	Resolution 1267 is a Security Council resolution that first authorized the freezing of the Taliban’s finances
2001	With Resolution 1373, which was adopted after the 9.11 attacks the international community put financial measures at the centre of its efforts to combat terrorism
October 2001	The FATF expands its mandate to include operations against the financing of terrorism.
2002	The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism criminalizes the financing of terrorism internationally
2003	The UN Convention Against transnational organized crime created an international framework against organized crime
April 2004	In Resolution 1540 the Security Council decided that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes.
October 2004	In Resolution 1566, the Security Council “calls upon states to extradite or prosecute, any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist acts or provides safe havens”
2015	The Convention Against Corruption created an international legal instrument against corruption
July 2005	Security Council’s Resolution 1617 “Strongly urges all Member States to implement the comprehensive, international standards embodied in the

	Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and the FATF Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing".
September 2005	Security Council's Resolution 1624 recalled that "states must co-operate fully in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the financing [...] of terrorist acts"
2006	With resolution 60/288, the UN adopted its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, through which the General Assembly agreed that states should refrain from financing terrorist organisations, and also encouraged states to adopt the nine special recommendations on Terrorist Financing of the FATF.
2012	Resolution 67/186 "Strengthening the rule of law and the reform of criminal justice institutions, particularly in the areas related to the United Nations system-wide approach to fighting transnational organized crime and drug trafficking" was passed by the General Assembly.
2013	Resolution 68/193 "Strengthening the United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice programme, in particular its technical cooperation capacity" was adopted by the General Assembly.
2014	With Resolution 2178 the Security Council urges Member States to disrupt terrorist financing activities linked to foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) and to criminalize the financing of FTF travel.



B. Conclusion

There is also a consensus that, in the wake of heightened international efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, more should be done to keep an eye on IFT systems to avoid their misuse by illicit groups. Policymakers believe that the potential anonymity afforded by these systems presents risks of money laundering and terrorist financing that need to be addressed. Yet selecting the appropriate regulatory and supervisory response requires a realistic and practical assessment and an understanding of the specific country environment in which the IFT dealers operate. Regulation of IFT systems in various jurisdictions will be a complex endeavor. The variety of legal systems and economic circumstances across countries make a uniform approach technically and legally impractical. In a number of countries, the hawala system is prohibited. Any attempt to regulate this system in these countries would, therefore, be at odds with existing laws and regulations and would be seen as legitimizing parallel foreign exchange operations and capital flight.

Where IFT regulations are conceivable, there is agreement that overregulation and coercive measures will not be effective because they might push IFT businesses, including legitimate ones, further underground. The purpose of any approach is not to eliminate these systems but to avoid their misuse. Against this background, policymakers tend to favor two options, which are already in force in some countries: registration or licensing of IFT systems.

While these measures could deter illegal activities, they will not, in isolation, succeed in reducing the attractiveness of the hawala system. As a matter of fact, as long as there are reasons for people to prefer such systems, they will continue to exist and even expand. If the formal banking sector intends to compete with the informal remittance business, it should focus on improving the quality of its service and reducing the fees charged. Therefore, a longer-term and sustained effort should be aimed at modernizing and liberalizing the formal financial sector, with a view to addressing its inefficiencies and weaknesses.

C. Questions a Resolution Should Cover

- 1) How has Hawala been useful?
- 2) Should Hawala be deemed illegal globally?
- 3) If yes, what actions should be taken against individuals taking part in hawala?
- 4) Will deeming hawala illegal have any impact on Narco terrorism and smuggling?
- 5) Is there any way Hawala can be brought into the legislative and regulatory framework of the central bank & financial authorities of countries?
- 6) To what extent is hawala trade responsible in the smuggling of ammunition and Narco terrorism?
- 7) What would be the social implications of legalizing hawala?
- 8) What will be the social implications of making hawala illegal?
- 9) What alternative means of micro finance should be explored with regards to providing liquidity to areas with no formal financial framework?
- 10) Why is hawala been so dominant despite the existence of organizations such as Western Union Money Transfer, which operate on a similar framework?

TOPIC B: Corruption in Prison Systems

A. INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENDA ITEM

Imprisonment creates a situation in which prisoners depend upon prison authorities for the fulfilment of almost all of their day-to-day needs, including access to basic necessities, such as food and drinking water. By depriving individuals of their liberty, the State automatically assumes a heightened duty to ensure that custody is enforced in a secure, safe and humane manner. This must include due diligence to prevent abuse and corruption that may be committed by prison staff, public officials and other detainees, and it requires a considerably higher level of due diligence than in a non-custodial environment. Prisons are particularly vulnerable to acts of corruption in comparison to other key justice institutions. This is due in part to the closed nature of imprisonment, the associated risk of insufficient public scrutiny and the fact that prisons, by definition, hold individuals accused of or sentenced for having committed criminal offences, including serious crimes. In addition—and despite their complex, difficult and sometimes dangerous work—prison staff tend to be held in lower regard than other public officials working in the criminal justice system. This often implies lower salaries, less training and fewer career opportunities, as well as difficulties in recruiting qualified staff which, in turn, further increases the risk of corruption taking root in prisons.

Corruption in prisons poses a severe security risk to prisoners, prison staff and prison management alike. Unsurprisingly, therefore, corruption is often identified as one of the main obstacles to the practical application of international standards and norms related to the management of prisons and the treatment of prisoners. Relevant examples include embezzlement of funds needed for necessary security measures and infrastructure; misappropriation of goods; hiring practices that do not consider the qualifications, merit and integrity of candidates; trafficking of mobile phones, drugs or weapons into and inside prison walls in exchange for bribes; and situations in which safety and the provision basic services are made subject to prisoners' ability to pay bribes. This risk is further increased if members of organized crime groups or high-risk prisoners manage to come into a position of power and control with respect to prison officials.



Corruption occurs in prison systems in a variety of forms. In the most basic version, correction officers accept bribes or sexual favors to smuggle weapons, drugs, or cell phones to inmates, or to provide inmates with other benefits. Corruption in prisons causes problems that go far beyond mere dishonesty on the part of employees. First, corrections officers, as well as other inmates, are frequently injured by smuggled weapons. Systemic corruption thus creates a violent and dangerous environment within prisons that affects every corrections officer.

The true extent of prison corruption is unknown. Most of the available information stems from media reports, inmate reports, and officers who report corrupt behavior by other officers. There is currently no systematic tracking of prison corruption. One explanation for the lack of data is society's view of prisoners. Many people believe that prisoners brought their problems upon themselves because of the crimes they committed. This leads to a lack of interest in what goes on behind prison walls. Another reason for the public's indifference is that prisons are generally not visible to them, and aren't a part of their daily routine. Finally, administrators often turn a blind eye to corruption because they don't want to attract negative publicity.



B. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

prisoners/inmates: Prisoners are people confined in long-term facilities run by the state or federal government or private agencies. They are typically people with felony convictions who have received a sentence of incarceration of 1 year or more. (Sentence length may vary by state because a few states have one integrated prison system in which both prison and jail inmates are confined in the same types of facilities.)

contraband smuggling: Contraband is defined as goods that are against the law to trade or to be imported or exported, or goods that are smuggled or a slave during the Civil War who was behind the Union lines. An example of contraband are drugs being carried across country borders.

the Counter Corruption Unit: An anti-corruption agency is a special police agency specialised in fighting political corruption and engaging in general anti-corruption activities. Most are founded by statute, but some have a constitutional status.



c. General Overview

There are three main types of corruption: acts of misfeasance, acts of malfeasance, and acts of nonfeasance. Acts of misfeasance are a form of wrongdoing where one does something lawful in an unlawful way, so that the rights of others are infringed upon. An example of this would be a prison official signing a contract with a company in which the company may not be the best choice for the prison, but the official profits personally from the deal. For instance, a prison may contract with medical services that are cheap, but also inadequate. The prison official owes the inmates the duty of care, but breached that duty of care by improperly performing a legal act. This is especially problematic when prison inmates are harmed as a result.

Acts of malfeasance are more blatant acts of misconduct. Acts of malfeasance are illegal acts, such as embezzlement, stealing from the prison, trafficking contraband, extortion, and oppression of inmates.

Finally, acts of nonfeasance describe inaction, or the failure to act when an act would have been required. The term nonfeasance is used in tort law and officers can be held liable if three conditions are fulfilled:

- i. prison officials owed a duty of care to inmates,
- ii. the officer failed to act on the duty of care, and
- iii. the officer's failure to act resulted in injury to the inmate.

The duty of officers includes the prevention of physical harm, such as assault or rape, to inmates. Other examples include not reporting misconduct by other officers or looking the other way when contraband is smuggled into the prison. A prominent example of acts of nonfeasance committed by correctional officers is the problem of inmate-on-inmate violence. One of the most scarring and inherently evil acts of violence is rape. According to the national inmate survey from 2012, 4 percent of inmates of state and federal prisons have been raped or

sexually victimized by another inmate, and 1.6 percent of jail inmates (11,900) reported being sexually assaulted by another inmate.

Acts of nonfeasance are the most common type of corruption in prisons, and are the hardest type of corruption to prove. Acts of nonfeasance contribute to an atmosphere in which corruption is acceptable within the prison work environment. Officers typically claim that they did not know about the illegal activities going on.

Officers very rarely report code violations by other officers because “whistle-blowers” are treated as enemies by coworkers and administrators. Whistle-blowers often face great professional and personal risks associated with exposing a corrupt individual, group, or agency. These risks include loss of employment and benefits, problems with securing future employment within the same occupational field, and being ostracized and/or terrorized by coworkers.

D) Previous Attempts to Solve This Issue

UNODC has extensive experience in supporting Member States to strengthen the compliance of their penitentiary systems with the international standards and norms related to the management of prison facilities and the treatment of prisoners. In addition, and as the guardian of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), UNODC has specific expertise in supporting Member States to effectively implement the provisions of the UNCAC by providing practical assistance and building the technical capacity needed to develop effective anti-corruption policies and institutions.

Recently, the relevant teams have joined forces to create a Handbook on Anti-Corruption measures in prisons (to be published at the end of 2016) and to provide more support to States parties in integrating anti-corruption measures into prison reforms.



1. Main Examples of Corruption in Prisons

-In 2006, the Metropolitan Police and Prison Services created a report that found that more than 1,000 prison staff had smuggled drugs and weapons as well as participated in inappropriate relationships with inmates within the walls of United Kingdom prisons. After the report was leaked to the press, prison corruption was identified as an endemic institutional flaw and made a national priority. The government took action and began many different initiatives including the removal of cell phones from prisons and an effort to halt the flow of drugs into prisons.

-In a 1989 case, the defendant, a correctional officer in the United States, was convicted of acceding to corruption for knowingly accepting sexual favours from two prisoners in return for his violation of his known legal duty to guard the prisoners instead of seeking their sexual favours. He forced one inmate to perform sexual favours under the threat of solitary confinement if she did not comply (first case) . The defendant promised another that he would take care of her once she got out of jail (second case) . The defendant challenged his conviction by the Circuit Court of St. Louis County (Missouri) on several accounts, but the court upheld and affirmed the conviction for acceding to corruption.

The court found that there was evidence demonstrating what the defendant gave “in return for” the (sexual) benefit he received. In the first case, the Court noted that it made no difference that the defendant may not have had the authority to place the inmate in solitary confinement. A prisoner might well believe that the guard had this authority or could effectively recommend the threatened sanction. In the second case, the Court explained that it was irrelevant that the

promise (to take care of the inmate once she was out of jail) may have been vague and indefinite; it was nonetheless sufficient to constitute an abuse of function.



-X, a prison officer in France, was put in charge of serving as an intermediary between the prisoners and the public post

office for incoming and outgoing mail. In this capacity, for several years, he had been taking money from letters sent to prisoners.

After several prisoners accused X of embezzlement, the prison director reported the facts to the public prosecution. While in custody in the context of the criminal investigation that then started, X revealed that he was addicted to gambling and had funded his addiction by misappropriating money sent in letters to prisoners, to which he had access through his role in the post service. He had also developed a strategy to conceal his wrongdoings by shifting the blame onto the accounting office. The criminal investigation revealed that in the time frame of less than one year, X had taken a total of over 17,000 EUR belonging to prisoners.

X, who confessed and entered a rehabilitation programme to address his gambling addiction, was convicted for embezzlement of private/public funds, fraudulent alteration of documents and the use of forged documents. He received suspended imprisonment and additional sanctions and was prohibited from exercising a public function.

D. Conclusion

Corruption has far-reaching harmful effects on prison staff, inmates, the public and the institution itself. In extreme cases, corruption facilitates drug trafficking, the establishment of organized crime operations and the escape prison inmates, thereby undermining safety and security within and outside of prisons. Corruption may also directly affect the treatment of prisoners and the conditions in which they live. When bribes are demanded for providing inmates with fundamental basic services such as access to food or health care, this can have devastating consequences and put immense pressure on the affected prisoners and their families. Similar pressure is faced when bribes are solicited for access to lawyers or family members, participation in rehabilitation programmes, or in relation to early conditional release or parole decisions. Embezzlement of funds designated for prisons or misappropriation of material can significantly affect prison infrastructure and services and in turn undermine prison security.

Furthermore, prisons face the same general corruption risks that affect the administration of any public institution. For instance, corruption may take place in the areas of procurement or recruitment, where decisions may be made based on favouritism or bribes instead of quality and merit.

Today, this problem is getting worse and worse. Employees in the system use their power to abuse and use people to their advantage. Because of this state of the system, hundreds of people are forced to continue their life after prison with dreadful memories of their past. but we still have a chance to solve this problem. There is no reason for people to suffer when they are serving their sentence. Corruption in prison is unfortunately not something that is specific to a certain place, in fact you can come across a lot of similar cases from all around the world. That's why this situation needs an immediate solution. You, as the delegates of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, will make sure that violations of human rights are going to come to an end and people can finally serve their sentence without being abused or used in any way by officers.

E. Questions a Resolution Should Cover

1. What can be done in order to improve the prison systems?
2. What kind of qualifications should be required to employ correctional officers?
3. What kind of dissuasive penalties should be applied to those who cause corruption in prisons?
4. Which trainings should be compulsory before starting to work in prisons?

F. References and Further Reading

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Recommended Documentary:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=38I6PaZSKj4>